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Are Human Rights a Philosophy of History? 
The Case for the Defense 
 
 On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a response – at least in part – to the horrors of the 
Second World War.1   The motivation for The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
represented in the phrase, “whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.”2  The first seven sentences 
of the preamble to the UDHR begin in a declaratory fashion, starting with, “whereas.”  They 
then trail off into sets of statements with undoubtedly appealing sounds (for example, 
“freedom, justice and peace in the world”).  However, upon reading these lines, one realizes 
that the UDHR is dictating the nature of the human being to other human beings (its reader).  
Occasionally, human rights are accused of imperialism.3  Such wordplays might be the basis 
of at least some of those claims. 
 Indeed, human rights do tell us about the nature of the human being – at least human 
rights’ view of the human being.  The UDHR’s first article is provocative:  “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  The tone itself does not surprise.  One 
would be surprised if human rights betrayed an allegiance to oppressive political ideologies 
(or perhaps any political ideology at all).4  However, it is not just the political state of the 
human being, at least “originally,” about which human rights tell us.  It is also about the 
existential characteristics of the human being.   Those characteristics are political – “free” 
and “dignified.”  However, those existential characteristics are also intellectual; they involve 
some level of cognitive process.  Human beings, claims Article 1, are “endowed with reason 
and conscience.”  Humanity has some kind of thinking machine.  Article 1 also states that 
human beings should “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,” or fraternité.  It 
appears, somehow, that brotherhood is connected to reason and conscience. Though reason 
and conscience may be baseline human characteristics, humanity appears to have had a 
difficult time realizing them.  Indeed, as the UDHR phrases it, it appears that humanity has 
spent more than a small amount of time involved in “barbarism.”5 
 Interesting about all this is the idea that human rights may involve a philosophy of 
history.  Clearly, human rights are sometimes thought to involve stories. Rights scholar 
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Joseph Slaughter compares human rights to Bildungsroman, for example – stories of 
individual development in which people are socialized to learn what “everyone presumably 
already knows.”6  Rights, argues Slaughter, are romantic, enlightenment stories.   It has also 
been suggested that specific narratives – usually of traditionally oppressed groups – have to 
be injected into understandings of rights.7  This also does not surprise.  It feels logical that 
imaginations of the past would play into senses of the injustices rights are intended to 
address.  However, stories, imaginations, and philosophies of history may not be the same.  
“Stories” might be about the past or might not.  One can say the same about imaginations; 
they might be fictional, or they might be real.8  Philosophies of history, however, presumably 
are about “reality” – the “past.”  At least philosophies of history involve projects concerned 
with making sense of the past, or interpreting projects of human development.   Hence, in 
addition to a story (as well as law, international norm, institutional practice and dimension of 
foreign policy), human rights might “be” a philosophy of history.  At least a particular 
philosophy of history might play a role in the imagining of rights.  This might help accord 
rights a particular place in today’s world – a contemporary world we somehow inhabit and 
take as connected to a past. 
  The aim of this paper is to explain what a human rights philosophy of history might 
be, how such a philosophy of history might function, and why it might be important that 
human rights maintain, or reflect, a philosophy of history.  A number of steps are necessary 
to make this argument.  First, it will be necessary to discuss what a philosophy of history is.  
Philosophy of history maintains a high level of interplay with history.  As a field, philosophy 
of history’s importance has diminished – it once lay at the heart of debates over the destiny 
of historical studies.  Philosophy of history also lay at the heart of the birth of new 
disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology.  The field has become a bit marginalized in 
the latter years of the twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first.  That is even 
though the area encompasses some of the headline names of the humanities and social 
sciences (Hegel, Marx, and Foucault would be among these).9  To this extent, it is important 
to get a sense of what philosophy of history is.  There are several branches of philosophy of 
history. When this paper refers to the philosophy of history, it specifically means 
“speculative philosophy of history.”  “Speculative philosophy of history” is a distinct branch 
of philosophy of history, which this paper will describe. 
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 Secondly, it will be necessary to delve into the UDHR to reveal how a philosophy of 
history is manifested in human rights.  At the very least it should be clear how one can find a 
philosophy of history in one of human rights’ central documents.   The UDHR, albeit very 
briefly, refers to the past in its discussion of “barbarism” and earlier “disregards” for human 
rights.  The UDHR also refers to the past as justification for realizing human rights that 
humanity has previously denied.  The conundrum in the midst of this situation, however, is 
why, if we are born into “reason and conscience,” would it be a problem to realize human 
rights?  Why would we not realize something “inherent” to us?  The UDHR claims that rights 
are the most natural things in the world.  Rights are central to all of us (one theorist has 
claimed that rights proceed “social custom, judicial announcement, or some act of 
parliament”).10   Therein, individual poor behavior is not a valid explanation for rights’ 
violation.  We have the characteristics by which we would not violate rights. Therein, an 
absurdity lies at the heart of human rights:  humanity is apparently supposed to rerealize 
something that is already there (reason and conscience).  The question thus becomes, if 
humanity was not able to realize such things the first time (reason and conscience), why 
would it be able to realize them now?  Why did humanity behave unreasonably and 
unconscientiously (“barbarously”) in first place?   These are the types of question speculative 
philosophy of history addresses.  
 To conclude, this paper will discuss why examining the philosophy of history and 
human right thought, in conjunction, is important.  Why in a larger sense does it matter that 
human rights involve a “philosophy of history?”  Why does it matter that human rights make, 
or at least encourage us to make, holistic meditations on the past?  Is there any social 
relevance to academic discussions asserting that a mode of thought most popular in centuries 
to which we do not belong lies at the heart of a mode of thought belonging to a century to 
which we do belong?  I will claim that the answer lies in belonging – humanity’s belonging 
to its own time, and the relationship humanity maintains with rights in the times it inhabits.   
Ultimately, this involves the question of whether or not we, in our times, maintain 
meaningful relations with the concept of the past at all.  A human rights philosophy of 
history suggests we do.  
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Philosophy of History:  Senses of Ancientude 
Philosophy of history is not a new discipline.  Undoubtedly, the field enjoyed popularity 
during the mid- to end of the twentieth century – that being when the humanities and social 
sciences were in varying degrees of crises about postmodernism.  Might man really be 
washed away like a “face on the edge of the sea?” as Michel Foucault suggested it would.11  
The point was that, generally, modernity had posited man and history as going hand in hand.  
A diverse and influential school of history in France – the so-called Annales School – once 
claimed it was interested in “history without people.”12  Its emphasis, as one of Annales’ 
founding fathers claimed, was on the longue durée – vast spans of time often having as much 
to do with the environment as anything social.13  Annales was not postmodern.  “History 
without people,” however, encapsulated the problem.  Deconstructing the human subject 
sounded dangerous.  Perhaps it was the end of history.  At least it appeared to present a 
challenge to human identity and belonging.14 
 Philosophy of history enjoyed a resurgence in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and the start of the twentieth century (the other end of the “short twentieth 
century”).15  This was a time when it was not always easy to tell where, precisely in a 
disciplinary sense, one was located.  Psychology was new – at least the clinical psychology 
(the first psychology lab opened in 1879) – and anthropology and sociology were in the 
initial stages of branching off into their own disciplines.16  Sociology presented a particularly 
interesting case.  For a while, it was difficult to tell if one was a historian or a sociologist.  
Important figures to the history of sociology – August Comte, Émil Durkheim, Max Weber, 
Georg Simmel – all maintained significant interest in philosophy of history. A central work 
in Simmel’s oeuvre was explicitly dedicated to philosophical problems in the area, “The 
Problems of the Philosophy of History” (1892).  In part, the overlap concerned the fact that 
history and sociology, as well as psychology and anthropology, all addressed the collective 
life of human beings.  This was in the various modes in which humanity’s life forms 
expressed themselves the past as well as in the present.17 
 The centrality of philosophy of history also connects to ranges of phenomena in 
nineteenth-century Europe.  Such broad statements involve gestalt views of the past both 
historians and philosophers of history occasionally eschew.18  Indeed, some point to 
“historicist” outlooks and preoccupations with philosophical views of the past as specifically 
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German.19  To some extent, this is true.  German historians, philosophers, and humanists 
dominated historicism.20 Historical thought, however, was not purely German.  Historical 
thought connected to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment intellectual trends in a general 
sense. These involved, among other things, Western investigations of the human being in its 
fundament, attempts to establish laws about human beings as well as the social ramifications 
of historical ideas.21 These were problems for philosophers and historians.  However, they 
also concerned problems of nation-building, imperial expansion and the establishment of 
modern political parties.  As Claire Norton asks, how might one have a nation or political 
project without having a national or political story? 22  Indeed, how might one claim to found 
nations or political parties without national or political stories that one might prove, or at 
least argue, to be true?23  “History” and philosophical reflections upon it became important.  
Philosophy of history was bound into central projects defining the cultural spaces of modern 
Europe and, due to European expansion, spaces beyond Europe as well. 
  As the field is usually discussed today, philosophy of history has three branches.  
The first is historiography.  One authority describes historiography as investigating the 
“history of the writing of history itself.”24 Historiography involves finding the roots of the 
modern historical mind – modes of comprehending the past concerned with new “forensic” 
(“scientific”) attitudes; ideas, as it was famously put, of finding the past as it “actually was.”25  
This is a famous idea – the proclamation of a historical science by Leopold von Ranke.26  
However, historiography also involves finding variants within forensic attitudes. Can 
historiographers find ways of writing history – either in longer distant or nearer pasts – 
denying forensic concepts?  Historiography can also ask us to think of representing the past 
as something other than a mode of scientific investigation (Jacob Burckhardt asked historians 
to stand closer to art, or levels of gestalt picture creation, rather than purely empirical modes 
of investigation).27  Historiography tells history’s history in relation to the emergence of its 
various concepts and the distinctions between them.  Historiography involves discerning the 
unity and diversity in the history of historical practice. 
 “Critical philosophy of history,” also known as “analytical philosophy of history,” 
can be considered philosophy of history’s second discipline.  “Historical judgment” is the 
analytical terrain of that philosophy of history’s “critical” investigator.28  “Historical 
objectivity” may be the field’s central purview.29  Critical philosophy of history involves 
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history’s truth claims – does history, or at least do historians, use adequate theories of 
knowledge?  Do historians, make logical assertions concerning the epistemologies they 
invoke in the context of knowing the past?  These are heavy questions for historians.  It is no 
small task to sift through archives, the arguments of other historians and deal with material 
that is “out there.” That is as opposed to material “in here,” or cognitive epistemological 
questions.  Still, the problem of knowledge is powerful.  It is hard to know about anything 
without a theory of knowledge.  This is at least employed in an implicit, if not explicit, sense.  
History, notes one critic, must relate to “other forms” of knowledge.30  This includes theories 
of knowledge in themselves. 
 Speculative philosophy of history, the focus of this paper, can be considered the heart 
of philosophy of history. Speculative philosophy of history presumes one can know the past.  
Speculative philosophy of history departs from the idea that history is universal.  Speculative 
philosophy of history focuses upon problems of difference; the idea that multiple human 
cultures have developed over time is central.  However, speculative philosophy of history 
feels a duty to investigate why change happens; the area theorizes change itself.  That is the 
problem many analytical philosophers of history have with philosophy of history’s 
speculative branch – “looking at history as a whole.”31  What one can do, claim advocates of 
analytic approaches, is make valid arguments about the past.  Knowing the nature of history 
– the past “itself” – verges on impossible.32 
 Critical philosophy of history emerged as a reaction to speculative philosophy of 
history.  Philosophers, historians, and other social scientists (never mind the man or woman 
in the street), one critic has argued, “Should not engage in unfounded speculations about the 
past.”33  Thought about the past should not be “wild eyed dreaming.”34  Speculative 
philosophy of history departs from “meta,” or large-scale theses about ranges of issues – 
time, the human being, the possibility of human meaning and the idea that there might be 
“goals” in historical processes.  Speculative philosophy of history works off a priori 
assumptions.  Empiricism, though at least some speculative philosophers of history have 
claimed to have been “empirical” (Marx and Hegel claimed to start with the definite “facts” 
of human history), is not the modus operandi of the speculative philosopher of history.35  
Analytical philosophers of history may have a point.  The space for critico-analytical 
philosophy of history is checking the logic of the assertions historians make.  It is also to 
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check the conceptual forms of the more philosophically-inclined counterparts which 
historians sometimes find in their company.  It may well be that, unchecked, speculative 
philosophy of history veers on theology; it can be “providential.”36  Speculative philosophy 
of history may resemble religious-like assertions about the nature of time, space and “man.” 
 Historiography, however, or at least investigations into historiography, may also rely 
on speculative philosophy of history.   Published in 1973, Hayden White’s Metahistory:  The 
Historical Imagination of Nineteenth-Century Europe, is perhaps the most influential work 
written in the last thirty or forty years in any areas of philosophy in history.  White’s work 
represents a plethora of choices for the historical thinker – “empirical” or “philosophical.”  
Regardless of on what plane we engage it, argues White, history involves emplotment. To 
think about history is to give it its structure.  To think about history is to engage in narration.  
It is to tell stories.37  This makes history, at least in part, a matter of literature.  Though in the 
years since, White’s arguments have become more or less accepted, at the time that most 
historians did not conceive of history this way.38  Most trying to engage history thought they 
were naively describing the past.  One appeared to “find” history rather than emplot it.39  One 
tried to uncover truth.  This was not the reality, however – at least not for White.  As argued 
in Metahistory, there may be potentially no “proper history” which is not at the same time a 
“philosophy of history.”40  In other words, writing history always involves a priori 
assumptions. “The possible modes of historiography are the same as the possible modes of 
speculative philosophy of history.”41  This repeats White’s assertion, but with a different 
twist.  White again tells us that speculative philosophy of history is central to historical 
practice.  However, historiography, White tells us, has particular modes because philosophy 
of history functions in relation to particular modes – aesthetic forms that imaginations of the 
past inhabit. 
   In Metahistory, White lays out a range of modes through which history and 
speculative philosophy of history play out (again, that as at least for White, history “is” 
speculative philosophy of history).  One can explain history via classic approaches to literary 
emplotment.  White points to Northrop Frye’s 1957 Anatomy of Criticism to outline three 
options.  Most emplotment, White argues, boils down to romance, tragedy, comedy or satire.    
Romance is the emergent hero transcending evil – he or she who claims virtue over vice and 
wins the day.  Romance is “the sort of drama associated with the Grail legend.”42  Romantic 
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history is humanity triumphant; Christ resurrected.  The Romantic sees liberation from 
imprisonment.  These are concepts important to human rights. 
 Comedy, tragedy and satire are all a little different.  Comedy is occasional 
reconciliations of differences; the humorous “realization.”  Comedy, however, is also the 
coming apart of difference again to reveal irony and uncanniness. Comedy is Puck in A 
Midsummer’s Night Dream, announcing the whole course of events was imagined.  Tragedy 
is destruction; tragedy concerns the inevitability of the world as larger than oneself.  Try 
though they might, for example, Romeo and Juliet cannot move beyond the dire straits in 
which they find themselves.  Satire is the world as in fact truly larger than oneself.  At least 
with tragedy, one becomes educated; one learns about the possibility of folly or one’s place 
in the world (Romeo and Juliet at least provides a lesson).  Satire is darker, however.  Satire 
is based on the idea of the “ultimate inadequacy” of action – the idea that, never mind 
resolution, one might not even gain insight.43  In satire, things might just be bizarre, random, 
and uncanny.  These are views, asserts White, one can employ to address fiction.  They can 
help to create “poetry.”44  However, they can also be used in the context of “real” humanity.  
They are views one can use to describe the evolution of the past. 
 Despite the power of classic literary plots, however, White also asserts that one can 
philosophize about history via “formal argument.”  That is, in addition to plot, one can make 
assertions about “putatively universal law[s] of causal relationships” between events.45  This, 
somehow, is metahistory as metahistory – attempts to add depth to claims that one is actually 
talking about the past and not just emplotting events which concern reality or might not.  
White uses another mid-twentieth-century reference for “formal argument”:  Stephen 
Pepper’s 1942 World Hypothesis:  A Study in Evidence. White identifies four approaches to 
history, “formist,” “organicist,” “mechanistic” and “contextualist.”  Mechanism concerns 
studying history to “divine the laws that actually govern [history’s] operations.”46  
Mechanism tries to write history to “display in a narrative form the effects of those laws.”47    
Mechanism focuses upon finding rhyme and reason in historical processes – regularity in a 
machine; “patterns and rhythms” for the “whole” swath of human events.48  Formism   
concerns “the identification of the unique” in the historical field – allowing relativity 
between objects or at least a relativity between experiences.49  Here, White’s arguments may 
be less clear.  It is hard to see where “putatively universal” laws apply to Formism; the issue 
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seems to concern the unique and the possibility of irregularity.  Organicism seeks integration 
of the unique and universal – that there might be laws governing the relations between the 
two (indeed, White suggests that this is usually the case).50  Organicists (Hegel is an 
example) eschew the notion of “laws” on behalf of concepts of “ideas” or “principles.”51  The 
issue is that it is unclear what the difference is between a “law” and a “principle.”  Both seem 
to concern the nature of change.  Contextualism concerns notions “that events can be 
explained by being set in the ‘context’ of their occurrence.”52  Again, to the extent that 
“formal argument” concerns “putatively universal laws” of causal relationships, it seems less 
than  clear what context has to do with law except to the extent that it might be a law that 
something reacts to its context.  Mechanism thus seems the paradigmatic form of explanation 
via formal argument. 
 Finally, White argues that one can also argue about history via “ideological 
implication.”  By “ideological implication,” White has in mind stories offered by modern 
political ideologies and political philosophies – socialism, liberalism, radicalism, 
conservatism, anarchism, and even fascism.  White picks out four.  “Conservatives,” writes 
White, “are inclined to imagine historical evolution as a progressive elaboration of the 
institutional structure that currently prevails, which structure they regard as ‘utopia’.”53  
“Utopia” is here proposed as “the best form of society that men can…hope for.”54  
Conservatives thus become relatively non-utopic.  That is to the extent that utopia might be 
imagined as a form for humanity not yet achieved.55  Liberals “imagine a time in the future 
when [current] structure[s] will have been improved.”56  That will be a “remote” future, 
however.  It will take time and reform to reach utopia.  Radicals “are inclined to the view the 
utopian condition as imminent.”57  This “inspires…concern with the provision of the 
revolutionary means to bring…utopia to pass now.”58  For political readers, this is perhaps a 
bit less radicalism in the sense of modern “radical” parties than a mode of political behavior 
– engaging the political avant-garde and seeking revolutionary action.  Finally, anarchists are 
“inclined to idealize a remote past of natural-human innocence from which men have 
fallen.”59  Humanity’s fall from natural innocence has resulted in “corrupt” social states – 
states characterizing a good deal of human history.  Still, for the anarchist, not all is lost.  
This is because of the essence of the free, naïve, potential-driven characteristics residing 
within the human being.  From the anarchist perspective, utopia and liberation are possible 
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“at any time, if men will only seize control of their own essential humanity.”60  Such 
“seizing” happens through will or consciousness.  The “anarchist” perspective is contingent 
upon the idea that humanity maintains consciousness – that one may act in accordance with 
reason, or measured invocations of logic and will.  Like Romanticism, there is much here that 
seems to resonate with human rights. 
 The upshot of Metahistory is that what historians, philosophers of history and, indeed, 
any historical thinker do is combine available modes of emplotment and analysis.  
Essentially, historical thought is a dinner plate made from the buffet of cognitive options 
available at the table of historical representation.  Not all dishes go together.  One cannot 
combine comedy and mechanism, for example.  Mechanism demands more resolution than 
comedy provides.  One may also not combine Radicalism and satire.  One sees change as 
highly possible, the other less so.  Indeed, the combination of twelve essential tropes boils 
down to four:  metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony (White’s touchstone is linguist 
Roman Jakobson).61  There are a great number of specifics in Metahistory.  However, at the 
most fundamental level, White asserts that when one discusses history, one is discussing 
stories.  One is discussing tracing “sequence[s] of events lead[ing] from inaugurations 
to…terminations of social and cultural processes.”62  One should grant history “formal 
coherence…as a comprehensible process.”63  Links or reasons should exist for relations 
between history’s “beginning[s], middle[s] and end[s].”64  Logics should be provided.  
Indeed, if the story one is telling concerns “humanity” – all of humankind at one time – one 
can remove the “s” from the end of “beginning,” “middle” and “end.”  That is as history itself 
– history regarding everyone – has a “beginning, middle and end.”  Such things, however, are 
not just “history.”  They are also part-in-parcel the historical-philosophical thinking that all 
“history” inevitably represents – speculative meditations on the past and the nature of its 
unfolding. 
Human Rights:  The Emergence of the Hero 
 To properly discuss human rights as a philosophy of history we must define what human 
rights are and how they might be understood.  Again, this paper uses the UDHR as its point 
of departure. The UDHR is a document with a complex history.  The attempt to overcome at 
least several decades of European “nihilism” became the impetus behind an international 
rights declaration, as well as rights’ incorporation into the United Nations, in the late 1940s.65  
10
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The Holocaust was pivotal.  As one scholar puts it, memories of the “camps” weighed 
heavily on the minds of international leaders after the Götterdammerung of the Second 
World War.66  Nonetheless, the Holocaust was but one in a range of significant social justice 
issues influencing the constitution of international rights – issues of Third World 
development and sovereignty among them.67  As noted, the UDHR gained approval from the 
UN General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948.  It was not always clear that rights 
would be part of the UN agenda.  Rights were significantly downplayed in some of the 
proposals leading to the UN.68  Once rights were included in the UN Charter, there was again 
debate about which should be emphasized.69   Forty-four of fifty-two voting nations more or 
less agreed.  Eight nations were more skeptical. 
 The eight “skeptics” of the initial UN family were South Africa, Saudi Arabia, 
Belarus, the Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR.  These states did 
not vote “no” to the UDHR.  They did, however, abstain, meaning they refused to participate 
in the proceedings.  South Africa was concerned about Apartheid.  Eric Louw, South African 
representative to the UN, noted that the UDHR might “destroy the whole basis of the multi-
racial structure” of South Africa.70  In the end, the UDHR may have indeed contributed to 
this.71  The Saudis thought at least the specific form of rights described in the UDHR – 
liberal, gender equality, and stressing religious freedom – was too Western.  Such 
perspectives ignored more “ancient civilizations,” argued Saudi representative Jamaal 
Baroody.72  The communist states – Belarus, the Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR – objected because they thought the UDHR placed too much 
emphasis on individual free speech rights.  That was as opposed to more collectively thought 
economic rights.  Paraphrasing one scholar, the Soviet argument was that one’s “belly must 
be full” before one can worry about free speech and political freedom.73 
 There may have been something to the communist objection.  The UDHR does 
prioritize what are called “civil and political rights” (CPRs), as opposed to “economic, social 
and cultural rights” (ESCRs).  The opposition is roughly between liberal rights (free speech, 
legal equality and democratic participation) and more socialist rights (the right to work, 
welfare, free education, health care and material security).  About two thirds of the UDHR – 
articles 2 through 21 – concentrate on CPRs.  That is as opposed to four articles 
encompassing ESCRs (22 through 26).  It may be impossible to avoid ascribing human rights 
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a liberal core.  The “full and free” development of the individual, Joseph Slaughter argues, is 
the end game of rights.74  There is logic to this.  Even Marx thought the reallocation of 
economic resources was ultimately in the service of free individuals.  The reorganization of 
economics should hopefully lead to the reintegration of the human being.  On a good day, 
argued Marx, one would “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening 
and criticize after dinner.”75  It was a bucolic, free, critical and intellectual existence. 
 After 1948, the UDHR became the touchstone for rights.  The international human 
rights regime – loosely, the broad collection of documents, legislation, courts, organizations, 
institutions, conventions and declarations pertaining to rights – spreads in myriad 
directions.76   The UN maintains ranges of conventions, including but not limited to the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989).  The UN maintains tribunals to help societies transition from periods of conflict.  The 
most famous of these are the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  Regional organizations, such as the Organization of 
American States, the European Union, and African Union maintain their own human rights 
declarations (the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights, and the 1981 African Charter of Human and People’s Rights).  
International organizations, most famously Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
investigate and publicize human rights violations.  Some states have adopted human rights 
into national law – the 1998 British Human Rights Act is an example.77  The International 
Criminal Court prosecutes crimes against humanity.  Views on rights are not necessarily 
uniform.  Somehow, however, the precepts of the UDHR stand underneath by far the larger 
part of the plethora of rights practices and institutions.  Especially via their emphasis on 
CPRs and ESCRs, the UDHR’s precepts form the essential foundation of the larger part of 
the human rights world. 
 Where is philosophy of history in all this?  Where are the large-scale interpretations 
of the past – the “putatively universal” laws of historical change outlining a human rights 
“philosophy of history?”  Why would it not only be important where and how human rights 
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maintain a philosophy of history, but that human rights maintain a philosophy of history at 
all? 
 If one is willing to look more closely at the precepts of philosophy of history, the 
answers to at least the first question are relatively simple.  Firstly, one needs agreement about 
what – which document, institution, court, practice or idea – one is referring to when one 
discusses human rights.  In this paper, the UDHR is taken as representative of the 
international rights regime.  Secondly, one needs to find human rights’ “beginning, middle 
and end” tale.  Again, there is a particular reliance in human rights on romantic and anarchist 
tropes or narrative structures.  Human rights portray heroic victories and recoveries of naïve 
humanity through invocations of the human “essence.”  First and foremost, however, 
Romanticism and anarchism are beginning to end tales.  Humanity begins in one place and 
ends another (the victory of a concept or the recovery of an essence).  The beginning to end 
structure is what makes Romantic and “anarchic” narratives relevant to philosophies of 
history.  Human rights chart a course of events; they chronicle humanity’s unfolding.  Where 
are such chronicles in human rights?   What is the human rights “journey” beyond emerging 
heroes and “essential” humanity? 
 “Beginnings, middles and ends” are some of human rights’ clearest points.  All rights, 
the UDHR maintains, extend from two concepts.  Firstly, the human being is born “free and 
equal in dignity and rights” (article 1).  Humanity’s original human state was “with rights.”  
Rights are “natural.”  However, it is difficult to miss the historical designation in this idea:  
that all human beings at all times were born with rights.  This of course means that every 
human individual is born such a way:  free and dignified.  However, it also means that every 
human being at any time was born in such a state.  Indeed, the point seems to be that 
sometime, in a mythic past, humanity had a mythic, bucolic origin.  Perhaps this is true; 
certainly, it provides a more optimistic take on human life than Thomas Hobbes’ concept of 
human existence as “nasty, brutish and short.”78  Regardless of the veracity of the claim, 
however, human rights clearly tell us that human history started a particular way.  Human 
existence, in good, natural law form, began as “free.”79 
 The free human being, however, was not only free.  Using Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
phrasing, it was not just that man was “born free,” yet is “everywhere in chains.”80  The 
human being was also born into “reason and conscience” (article 1).  Humanity came with 
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cognitive and reflective capacities over and above essential political and/or social states (free 
and dignified).  Humans could reflect.  Humanity was able to think.  That helps justify rights.  
The positing of a human essence means that unless one wants to defend essential hierarchical 
social structures, one has to accord a modicum of egalitarian recognition to all human 
beings.81  Such concepts constitute the essence of rights. 
 Still, humanity encountered problems.  In White’s words, humanity was “corrupted.”  
Humanity fell into “chains.”  Evil entered human affairs.  Humanity stopped behaving 
reasonably.  Some started to deny others freedom.  This was history’s middle.  It is where the 
torsion, or drama, in the human plot took place – the entry of history’s villains and the use of 
reason and conscience for purposes other than liberation. 
 In a way, it simply sounds like we are talking about stories.  Human rights are but a 
parabolic address to morality – Christ encountering the moneychangers in the marketplace.  
For human rights, however, such arguments are not only matters of bending to literary form.  
Rights should not tell tales.  Rights should offer statements about the past.  Barbarism is at 
least partly a statement about genocide.82  Barbarism is also a statement about the brutality of 
warfare – Europe and the world had been through two global conflagrations within the 
memory of most of those involved in formation of the UN and the UDHR.  Barbarism and 
the disregard and contempt for rights are statements oppressions such as racial and gender 
discrimination.  Rights are intended to ameliorate, or substantively change, such injustices.  
Everyone, without regard to race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status (article 2) should enjoy human rights.  Not 
everyone has, however.  Again, this is after an at least theoretical moment in which humanity 
was free, naïve and in enjoyment of rights. 
 Still, important for human rights is that not all hope is not lost.  Rights posit that 
humanity can save itself.  This concerns a number of factors.  One is the declaration of rights 
itself – the act of declaring rights via documents such as the UDHR.  Declaring human rights, 
especially universally, is a way of reversing “contempt” for rights.  Declaring human rights is 
a mode of embracing rights.  Declaring rights is a mode of asking global communities to 
embrace rights.  At the very least, the UDHR and subsequent rights documents proclaim 
human rights as a norm.  The UDHR and subsequent rights documents assert rights as 
present remade as well as a future destination for humanity.   The UDHR preamble offers 
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that “Whereas the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world…the General Assembly [of the United Nations] proclaims the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”  The 
authors of the UDHR clearly held that if one denies human rights, one denies the end of 
humanity.  The proclamation of human rights is intended as a realization of humanity’s 
potential. 
 Still, the UDHR is clear on the constitution of rights-based societies.  “Societies” here 
means national societies.  “Societies” may also mean regions without specific national 
borders.  “Society” might mean the international community.  As noted, freedom, justice and 
peace are the “common standards of achievement” for which all peoples should strive.  There 
are no boundaries on freedom, justice and peace.  Still, freedom, justice and peace also mean 
specific things.  Freedom, justice and peace mean “freedom of speech and belief.”  They 
mean “freedom from fear and want.”  They mean freedom from “tyranny and oppression.”  
They mean “friendly relations between nations.”  It is hard to say if the drafters or approving 
voters of the UDHR hoped individuals would “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening and criticize after dinner.”  They certainly imagined human beings 
getting along, though.  So does any reader of the document who believing in its precepts. 
 This becomes one way in which human rights maintain a philosophy of history.  
Human rights maintain narratives.  Human rights maintain beginning to end structures.  
Human rights maintain beginning to end structures with a middle.   The middle of human 
history is “barbarism.”  History’s middle – as well as the beginning and end – pertain to real 
events:  histories of human conflict; genocide, civil conflict, and social repression.  Human 
rights also provide notions for “inaugurations” of historical processes.  That involves the 
birth of humanity itself – the emergence of the reasonable, conscientious creatures human 
beings supposedly are.  There are notions of the “termination,” of “social and cultural 
processes.”  This concerns the realization of rights themselves.  This includes the UDHR’s 
stated goals for the international community (freedom, justice, peace).  However, the 
proclamation of rights themselves is a kind of beginning of an end.  Proclaiming rights 
represents the reemergence of rights consciousness.  Proclaiming rights represents humanity 
taking control of its “essential humanity” through “acts of consciousness.”  Again, the 
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wordplay here is drawn from the anarchist vision of history – that one might realize one’s 
“essential humanity” at “any time” if “by an act of will or consciousness” one engages the 
fundaments of rights.  “Anarchist” or not, however, the form of the idea touches on 
something deeper – a beginning to end structure connecting humanity’s ends and beginnings; 
humanity’s “terminations” and “commencements.” 
  Again, in theory, there is a story of the past here with greater status than fiction.  
Theoretically, rights stories concern sets of human realities that have been that (realities).  
This includes holocausts, marginalizations, cruelties, oppressions, and injustices.  The story 
concerns origins.  Origins of course are difficult to prove in “forensic” senses – senses of 
“scientific” pasts.  Human rights nonetheless posit origins at least providing justification for 
their political goals.  This concerns ideas that humanity maintains rights because rights are an 
intrinsic part of the human being. 
 Still, we are left with a conundrum:  why did humanity fall into barbarism, 
oppression, marginalization and injustice at all?  Why did humankind descended into the 
behaviors the UDHR seeks to root out – the violations of each other’s humanity that are part 
of the past; disregards and contempts for human rights into which many of us have fallen?  
Why have we done the things against human rights are a reaction?  Why did humanity fall 
from grace?  Why does humanity need a heroic return – a rights revolution, as such?83  In 
fact, why might we expect such a revolution? 
 The UDHR provides no immediate answers.  Nor does any other rights document (for 
example, those noted as part of the international human rights regime).  Rights offer no 
statements to the effect that “humanity behaves strangely for the following reasons.”  There 
are no statements proffering “the nature of history is as follows.”  Still, though rights may not 
provide putatively universal laws for historical change – explanations for “strange” or 
“barbaric” human behavior – human rights nonetheless provide putatively universal 
characteristics for humanity.  Humanity is free and dignified; humanity has a fundamental 
political state.  However, humanity also has reason and conscience – humanity has a 
cognitive state constantly accompanying the human being.  In theory, humanity was born 
with the cerebral characteristics in question; humanity “always” has reasons and conscience.  
If fundamental characteristics in fact have characteristics themselves – in other words, if 
reason and, if not conscience, then at least the consciousness, behaves certain ways, it could 
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be one is on one’s way to laws concerning how human beings behave.  That is behavior over 
time.  “Human behavior over time” resonates with the terrain of “history.”  Certainly a belief 
in how human behavior over time resonates with the terrain of a philosophy of history. 
The Logic of Heroes 
One might divide the field of speculative philosophy of history into optimists and pessimists.  
Different attitudes have pervaded speculative philosophy of history over time.  White 
addresses these through literary and explanicist modes.  For example, Hegel preferred 
tragedy and comedy to irony.  That is as tragedy and comedy provided levels of plot 
resolution irony do not.84  Marx was the ultimate mechanist; a thinker of “laws.”  Marx, 
argues White, sought laws governing history in the manner of a “physics presumed to govern 
nature.”85  Marx’s historical story was to be “scientific.”  This paper employs a different 
vocabulary.  This is to provide larger categorizations of trends concerning “putative” and 
“universal” historical change.  The idea is to stay within the bounds of stories – beginning to 
end structures.   However, the idea is also to look for a particular kind of story – stories 
defining the particular travails humanity has had.   These stories concern the “laws” of 
historical change. 
Given these categories, “optimists” tend to take the view that, though a long and 
sometimes radically violent road, there is a good chance of, if not inevitability in, humanity 
arriving at where it wants to go.  No two names from philosophy of history are better 
examples of this than Marx and Hegel.  Accepting these examples as but examples, however, 
Marx, like human rights, posits some modicum of consciousness, if not “reason,” at the start 
of history.86  It is part of our “species being,” Marx asserted, that humanity had some 
awareness of itself.87  Part of human “species being” is that we have awareness of our 
surroundings.  “Human consciousness” is confronted by the fact that “physically, man lives 
only on the products of nature.”88  Humanity has life.  Humankind has an origin, briefly 
naïve.  Shortly into its life, however, humanity gets some unfortunate news:  it has to work.  
The problem is that as soon as humanity works, it no longer belongs to itself.  As soon as 
humanity works, it begins to view itself as things – things that labor.  Because labor is so 
crucial, humanity also turns its labor into a thing (an object to be bought and sold, as well as 
something used to describe itself [commodities]).  In essence, Marx’s thesis was that such 
existential conditions have psychological results – alienation, or loss of the self.  In laboring 
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to live, asserts Marx, we suffer the “estrangement of man from man.”89  We lose the innocent 
core of who we are. 
Human history represents attempts to overcome this.  Of course, for Marx, 
overcoming alienation entails material effort.  Any degradation of labor – any non-
recognition of the full value of every human action (the “devaluation of labor”) – is cause for 
conflict.  Social classes embody this.  Social classes consist of those who perceive 
themselves as degraded on one side, and those who do not on the other.  Of course, for Marx, 
class was a historically-formed consciousnesses; class was a product of the drive to 
accumulate in order to survive.  Given the realities of accumulation, however, the conflict 
between two social groups could only go in one direction.  That was towards the liberation of 
the degraded – the “proletariat.”  The reason for this inevitability of the proletariat’s 
liberation was that wealth simply cannot be concentrated in few hands.  Over time, such 
conditions become untenable.    At the social level, then, history is thus bound to correct 
initial sets of class divisions emerging from humanity’s drive to accumulate the material 
wealth it needs to survive.  The essential alienation of labor might not disappear.   
Alienation’s creation of class conflict might, however. 
 Such perspectives become relevant to human rights as an essential human property – 
consciousness – combined with an essential condition (the need to survive) gives way to 
massive human conflict.  “The history of all hitherto existing society,” wrote Marx in The 
Communist Manifesto, “is the history of class conflict.”90  The transition from feudalism to 
capitalism was about class conflict.  The fight for better working conditions under capitalism 
involved conflict.  Revolutions against capitalism were matters of conflict.  Politically, Marx 
held, humanity can organize itself on behalf of itself.  At the very least, those on the losing 
end of historical accumulation might organize themselves on behalf of themselves.  The 
Manifesto was a call to do such a thing (“working men of the world, unite!” pleaded Marx; 
“you have nothing to lose but your chains!”).91  Still, there was no avoiding the essential 
conflict between haves and have nots characterizing the larger trajectory of the human story.  
History had immutable laws.  History’s laws, however, emerged not from bizarre or arcane 
locales.  Rather, history’s laws emerged from the heart of human beings and what they are.  
History, its conflicts, as well as its victories, emerged from the conscious nature of human 
life itself.  This is very close to a human rights perspective. 
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 Potentially, speculative philosophy of history’s best-known thinker is Hegel; a 
complex thinker who will have to be simplified here.92  Summarizing Hegel, however, is a 
matter of saying that, in a formal sense, he thought many similar things to Marx.  In essence, 
the difference between Marx and Hegel is that Marx maintained much more emphasis on the 
economic than the more idealistically oriented Hegel.  For Hegel, history in fact relies on 
matters of consciousness.  “Mind” and consciousness – “Spirit” (Geist) or some kind of sense 
perception (Sinn) – is the universal attribute of human beings.  Mind and reason are what 
endowed human beings with the ability to make history and marked them as human.  
However, like Marx, the nature of consciousness was to be in constant states of reflection on 
itself.  In essence, consciousness was in a constant state of doing and redoing its conception 
of both itself and the world.  “Being,” Hegel argued in one of the famous statements of 
modern philosophy, is “thought.”93  Thought, Hegel went on to say – perhaps a bit dauntingly 
– is “negativity” (Negativität).  It sounds pessimistic – that thought concerns destruction, or 
“annulling” (Aufhebung) somehow.  This ultimately was not necessarily a negative point for 
Hegel, however.  For Hegel, at stake were simple descriptions of the nature of knowledge.  
One did not know without turning something – the world or oneself – into an object (à la 
Marx, one had to see oneself).  This nonetheless meant something not unlike Marx’s 
description of the worker looking down and realizes he or she is just that – a worker, and, as 
such, an alienated being.   Reconciliation of this situation involved establishing rationalities 
and reasons for what one saw – what one perceived.  That was both about oneself as well as 
the world. 
 The importance of humanity’s psychological drama was that it had multiple effects. It 
involved not only individuals and thoughts, but culture, politics and the trajectory of global 
change itself.  In The Philosophy of History, a series of lectures Hegel delivered in 1837, 
during the latter stages of his career, he argued that forms of state represent the “culture of a 
nation.”94  Forms of state reflect the worldviews of individuals who, via their individual 
consciousnesses (or decision making processes), formed communities.  Culture for Hegel 
was a developmental process.  “Culture” (Kultur) represents the particular state in which one 
has “apprehended” oneself (again, “seen” is an equally applicable term).95  Culture was then 
how one makes sense of the states in which one found oneself – turning one’s reality into sets 
of principles and ways of doing things (indeed, German has two words for these concepts; 
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Kultur and Bildung [roughly, “culture” and “education”]).   These activities are the basis for 
social evolution and change.  They are also the basis for political evolution as politics reflect 
worldviews.  Changes in politics and society, however, are en toto, historical evolution.  This 
is with “history” as a larger category encompassing specific dimensions of the human 
experience.  Reason, spirit, mind – humanity’s animating forces – have to have the patience 
to pass through its various “shapes” over the “long passage of time.”96  Reason and 
conscience are the engines behind the “enormous labor of world history.”97  We are 
endowed, Hegel argues, with the ability to know.  The ability to know is nonetheless 
something of a curse as well. 
 This is a central point:  the ability to know is quite a curse.  As with Marx, this is 
where the relevance to human rights emerges.  The problem with knowledge, consciousness, 
conscience and reflection – and, moreover, that subjects are distributed through space and 
time – is that human subjects do not develop the same way.  In the manner of human rights, 
human beings might have the same essence.  Human beings also might have the same 
purpose – realizing and acting on the nature of the human essence.  However, at any given 
time, humans see things different ways.  That has historically meant conflict.  “History,” 
wrote Hegel, is the “slaughter bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States 
and the virtue of individuals has been victimized.”98  Hegel does not say much about 
international relations.  Hegel does, however, say a good deal about the negotiations involved 
in constituting civil society.99  Social negotiations are that – negotiations.  Indeed, while 
Hegel applauded what he called “world historical individuals” – individuals embodying and 
willing to act on the most advanced principles of their age (Napoleon was an example for 
Hegel). Hegel was nonetheless clear that the politics of state often involved war.  The 
“diffusion” of peoples and ideas, Hegel noted, could mean conflict.100  Believing something 
about oneself or about the world in general – humanity’s basic business – meant truths would 
likely come into conflict.  Someone might act on belief.  At that point, the slaughter bench 
would come out – barbarism. 
 Still, as with Marx, all was not lost for Hegel.  History’s conflicted process had a 
purpose.  The virtue of consciousness, thought Hegel – though also the root of human 
problems – was that consciousness could only be one thing:  consciousness.  It is a 
tautological argument – disputed as the best approach to causality.101  Tautology nonetheless 
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offered possibilities.  When one deals with an absolute – which in Hegel’s estimation, 
consciousness was – one is dealing with an A=A situation (Hegel’s vocabulary).102  What the 
unity of consciousness meant – as well as the omnipresence of consciousness, reflection and 
reason through human historical life – was that one had to figure out what their nature was.  
In the case of consciousness, its nature was knowledge.  The nature of consciousness 
revealed destiny.  This was for both groups and individuals.  The point of human history was 
knowledge about knowledge.  The point of human history was humanity advancing through 
knowledge’s stages to achieve “self-certainty.”103  Indeed, the point was science (orderly, 
verifiable approaches to knowledge).  With true insight into what knowledge was, rationality 
might appear.  Human rights are not necessarily concerned with science.  “Self-certainty,” 
however, also concerned politics. States might gain constitutions.  Statecraft might become 
rational and deliberated. International relations might be governed by law.  Even art might 
take on ever more penetrating forms.  The conscious and reasonable nature with which 
humanity was endowed might bear fruit.  Again, like human rights, this was in the form of 
cultural and political forms reflecting reason and expressing the logics of the characteristics 
to which humanity is bound. 
 Other optimists, such as Benedetto Croce and R.G. Collingwood, adopt similar forms 
of argumentation.104   Pessimists, however, not only have maintained varieties of speculative 
philosophy of history, but speculative philosophies of history putting similar issues into play. 
Humanity’s nature, as such – humankind’s “natural” characteristics – can cause change.  
That includes the problematic situations and places in which human history can end up. 
The difference between optimists and pessimists comes from their offering two 
different shapes for historical development.  Nietzsche, also one of modern philosophy’s 
thoroughly discussed figures, is well known for his idea of the ewige Wiederkehr – the 
“eternal return (of the same).”105  In works from “The Use and Abuse of History for Life” 
(1874), On the Genealogy of Morals (1885), Twilight of the Idols (1889) and  his best known 
philosophical novel, Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-5), Nietzsche maintained a slightly 
different historical prime mover than Hegel or Marx:  life.  Nietzsche’s views on life are 
intentionally diverse.  Nietzsche spoke explicitly against “systematizers” – those who tried to 
do precisely what Marx and Hegel did:  create “metahistories,” (larger understandings of 
historical processes).106  Still, it is not atypical to comprehend Nietzsche himself as 
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maintaining a grander vision.  White suggests that Nietzsche’s view of history was 
determined by a “need to flee from reality into a dream, to impose order on experience in the 
absence of any substantive meaning or content.”107  The lack of “meaning or content” in 
history meant that it intrinsically had none.  However, that humanity gave history direction 
and purpose meant that the question of direction and purpose at least deserved analysis. 
 In this context, the question became what history’s direction and purpose might be.   
As some have noted, especially in works such as Zarathustra, Nietzsche appears to provide 
hints that human desire provides order behind the chaos.  Zarathustra is ultimately a heroic 
tale; something akin to White’s “romantic” mode.  The story’s protagonist moves through 
ranges of trials and tribulations – a Bildungsroman in Slaughter’s sense.  The hero does not 
become enlightened, however.  Rather, the hero (Zarathustra) retreats from civilization.  The 
hero seeks a natural, organic existence.  Indeed, the hero seeks to commune with life itself 
(life in Zarathustra is portrayed as a woman who comes and speaks to him).108  Somehow, 
Nietzsche suggests, enlightenment, or the “end” history of history, is a kind of non-
enlightenment, or relinquishment of reason.  That is of course different than human rights.  
Rights seek recoveries of reason.  This difference, however, gives way to a key realization:  
reason is the concept that drove humanity precisely to history’s torsions and problems.  As 
Nietzsche characterizes it in not only Zarathustra, but works such as The Genealogy, the 
contest over viewpoints and the power of perspective on the world stage explains not only 
the history and diversity of modern political systems, but the general project of creating 
social order in any form.  Humanity appeals to visions of logic and incontrovertible truths to 
create social worlds.  Such visions are, however, but tools for but new modes of order – 
“slave revolts in morality.”109  For Nietzsche, it was best to relinquish control.  Unlike in 
human rights, there was no naïve utopia.  History had no natural resting place.  Still, that 
leads to a point in fact resembling human rights.  We had conscience and reason.  We had 
awareness.  They might not liberate us.  They did, however, effect where humanity went.  
This included the trouble in which humanity often found itself. 
  Again, this paper tries to establish patterns of thought and arguments involved in 
philosophy of history and resembling those of human rights; patterns of thought and 
arguments filling in the last gaps in human rights’ historical-philosophical arguments.  As 
with “optimists” – those seeing an “end” to historical processes – one could invoke more 
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“pessimists.”  Arthur Schopenhauer and Søren Kirkegaard might be primary among these.110  
Another key thinker in this area is Oswald Spengler.  While Spengler is not as well known 
today as Hegel or Marx, a look at this work (which was wildly popular in his time) reveals a 
meaningful philosophy of history.   His book The Decline of the West one of both 
philosophy’s and history’s best sellers through the 1920s.111  Decline is an extensive text.  In 
part, Spengler claimed to develop Nietzschean themes.  Civilizations rose and fell.  
Cosmopolitan worlds were the beginning of civilizations’ ends; indeed, for Spengler, 
“civilization” was equatable with the last stages of the life of a culture.  Again, I make short 
shrift of a complex and interesting work.  The problem, however, was “intellect.”112  We 
always had it.  Reason, consciousness and the mind were bound to assert themselves in one 
form or another.  Not unlike in Hegel, we were always involved negotiating images of 
ourselves and understandings of the world around us.  This gave humankind the urge to build 
civilizations – to universalize itself and turn itself into a totalizing cosmos (the cosmopolitan 
city was the mark of civilization, Spengler argued).  Very simply, however, in the move to 
universalization – cities and cosmos – people lost senses of themselves.  People and peoples 
became vacuus; without character.  In such precarious conditions – whether they realized 
their conditions or not – peoples might be challenged by cultures with distinctly stronger 
senses of self.  There was thus no infinite life in culture; all civilizations, argued Spengler, 
had “strictly limited and defined.”113  Civilizations would collapse, somehow, like every 
other life form.  Civilization would grow old, bloated and decay.   
 Like Nietzsche, Spengler saw no way of saving history.  Indeed, Nietzsche might be 
more optimism than Spengler to the extent that he suggested the possibility of finding solace 
in the quiet, contemplative life.  Still, history at least made sense.  History had a mechanism.  
Indeed, history’s mechanism was not unlike that suggested by human rights:  reason, or a 
mind of sorts.  We cognize and contemplate. This causes cultures to grow.  However, it 
causes human decline as well.  One had to be someone, Spengler thought; one had to have an 
identity.  The problem the intellect we tried to invoke in creating identities was nonetheless 
that it tried to speak for everyone.  Intellect was universal.  The intellect’s projects would 
ultimately fail, however.  That is as intellect was ultimately ours; individual. 
 Undoubtedly, rights more closely resemble Hegel’s and Marx’s approaches to history 
than Nietzsche’s and Spengler’s.  Human rights do not discuss proletarian revolution, like 
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Marx.  Though they provide cases for the importance of economics via the inclusions of 
ESCRs, human rights do not extensively portray conflicts for economic resources.  Still, 
Marx speaks to rights’ contradictions – points of initial awareness, series of problems 
emerging after humanity’s initial awareness, or the endowment of humanity with reason and 
conscience, and the possibility, if not inevitability, of victory over at least significant 
dimensions of humanity’s alienation from itself, or its “barbarism.”  Two points are salient.  
One is that history can save itself.  Humanity can realize its nature and institute political 
forms bringing human life in accordance with how it “should be.”  The human being should 
not experience the degrees of barbarism and torsion he or she does.  Nonetheless, social 
conflict, political conflict, and the torsions of historical change generally emerged precisely 
out of the essence of what humanity is.   Humanity is in possession of fundamental capacities 
and relations with the world that never change.  Those capacities and relations are 
humanity’s curse and salvation.  Human rights do not make this assertion.  They are, 
however, right on the cusp of doing so.  That consciousness is as problematic as liberating 
fits the human rights’ notion of “barbarism.”  The essential capacities maintained by human 
beings that might liberate us are also those which might give us trouble.  Reason and 
conscience, or at least consciousness, may cause “inhumane” behaviors as much as those we 
might consider “humane.” 
 Among those presented here, Hegel’s philosophy of history is that most closely 
resembling human rights’.  In rights’ literature, Hegel has been argued as helping to justify 
human rights as a political concept.114  However, Hegel has yet to be argued as providing a 
philosophy of history resembling that of human rights’.   Nonetheless, one can overlay certain 
of Hegel’s themes and those of human rights and see degrees of resemblance.  Conscience, 
consciousness, and reason are the heart of Hegel’s human being.  “Being is thought.”  
Thought will liberate humanity from its “slaughter bench” – there will be a time in the future 
when humanity will realize its capacity for reason.  It will use that capacity.  That means the 
presence of that capacity.  However, thought also gets in the way.  Thought creates partially 
complete forms of the human picture to come – worldviews under development that might be 
reasoned yet do not realize the full power of reason itself.  To this extent, humanity can 
behave irrationally.   Humanity will go to war with itself and is involved in sometimes tense 
negotiations over the nature of social order.  In Hegel’s view, this makes sense.  This is 
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because consciousness must labor.  Consciousness and reason must work, through time, to 
realize what they are.  This explains both both human victories and human downfalls.  The 
last mechanisms of a human rights philosophy of history are close to locking into place. 
 Both Nietzsche and Spengler were skeptical of such optimistic perspectives.  Such 
beliefs, both posited, derive from universalizations of reason.  These universalizations, 
though natural enough, were not always healthy for humankind.  Humanity will not save 
itself because reason is an occasion for trouble.  “Intellects” represent exercises of power; 
conscience and consciousness impose on the world.  Humanity is bound to social and 
intercultural conflict because when it asserts truth, it will inevitably conflict with the truth of 
others.  Still, though while of a different tenor than Hegel and Marx, properties lying very 
close to the heart of the human being – capacities for reason and knowledge – provide logics 
for historical change.  Capacities for reason and knowledge provide “putatively universal” 
laws via which humanity can expect “barbarism” at determined points within its history.  
Those points are the moments at which humanity uses its primal capacities to make its way in 
the world.  The difference between Nietzsche and Spengler and human rights (as well as 
Hegel and Marx) is that humanity will probably not make its way to the destinies or ends it 
would like. 
Eternal Returns:  Human Rights in a Post-Historical Age 
 It is not the case that human rights say “consciousness, reason, or conscience is why 
history changes.”  Human rights do not say “humanity is self-conflicted, causing its own 
victories and downfalls.”  Human rights do not say barbarism is a necessary dimension of 
“man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,” as Immanuel Kant once put it.115  
Human rights offer no explicit discussion of historical laws.  Human rights nonetheless assert 
it is prima facie possible to realize rights.  Human rights say human rights may be realized 
because of what human beings are.  Human beings are “free” and “dignified.”  Human beings 
have rough political and ethical characteristics.  However, human beings are also more than 
political and ethical.  Human beings are “reasonable.”  Human beings are endowed with 
“conscience.”  Indeed, it seems, in some ways, humanity is on its way to realizing at least 
part of the destiny rights suggest could be ours – worlds of “freedom, justice and peace.”  
Again, rights declarations and protocols might at least be a small step towards realizing such 
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a world.  The UDHR and its succeeding documents are intended to represent a degree of this 
realization. 
 Nonetheless, the UDHR also says humanity has spent a lot time not realizing rights.  
That is even though humanity was born into rights.  Moreover, humanity appears to be born 
into the capacity to realize rights.  At the very least, humanity seems born into capacities that 
appear to beg the accordance of rights to both ourselves and others.  This is reason and 
conscience.  Again, these are characteristics we all theoretically have.  There is a clear story 
in human rights.  This story is human history’s start in naiveté and at least potential ending in 
political forms reflecting our naiveté.  Ends and beginnings are related.  Nonetheless, there is 
also a “middle” in which rights have at the very least been highly contested; rights have been 
hard to realize.  This conforms with modes of thinking about the past identifiable as 
“philosophies of history.”  There is a “meta-story” in human rights.  They go from “here” to 
“there.”  Rights also invite clear speculation on why. 
“Why” is not an easy issue.  It is one thing to tell a story.  It is another thing to tell a 
story one purports to be true and offer a logic as to why that story has played out the way it 
has.    Rights are on the cusp of naming that reason.  They use answers that more than a few 
headline names from speculative philosophy of history provide.  Reason, consciousness, 
conscience – the intellect, ideas “at large” – are notions viewed in very different ways by 
very different philosophers of history.  Marx invokes these concepts in highly practical 
senses.  The mind helps us relate to the world.  The mind’s relation to the world, as well as to 
senses of self, is a tense one.  Those relations bring barbarity.  That is largely in the form of 
class conflict.  Still, something within the human essence works itself out over time.   That is 
as we are always animated by the drive to be who we are, to have a dignified existence.  This 
is a drive to be in control of ourselves, to have sovereignty over our life and thought. 
 Nietzsche and Spengler maintained highly skeptical views of such concepts.  Reason 
is undoubtedly present in human history.  Reason makes nothing but trouble, however; 
reason and conscience provide no grand reconciliations.  “Rationality” is our downfall rather 
than salvation.  “We suffer from man,” Nietzsche wrote.116  We are our own worst enemy.  
Still, this is the point.  Humanity can make itself suffer.  That is due to who, or at least what, 
we are (creatures reflecting on and making sense of the world).  Humanity will never quite 
get out of the loop of finding new ways to either torture itself or pretend to master the world 
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when in fact it does not.  It is the recovery that is missing for historical-philosophical 
pessimists in relation to figures like Marx. 
 In Hegel, we probably have the closest thing to a human rights “philosophy of 
history.”  It is worth reiterating that human rights do not set out to be a philosophy of history.  
One might thus debate whether they are a philosophy of history, or “represent” one.  There is 
a kind of confrérie between Hegel’s and human rights’ view of the past, however.  There is 
something naïve in “Spirit,” the “mind,” or general capacities for reason with which we are 
all endowed.  The mind has a freedom.  The mind seeks and may seek its own nature.  The 
mind may seek information generally as well as information about itself.  The road along 
which the mind seeks (cognates), however, is fraught with peril.  Realizing what we are is 
difficult.  The difficulty is largely generated by us.  That has to do with how hard it is for 
reason to know itself.  That is despite the fact that reason and mind seek to know themselves 
precisely because they are themselves (compounding the problem at the same time that it 
provides the ultimate solution; “self-certainty”).  This paper has intentionally stayed away 
from the precise political forms towards which Hegel would like to see humanity move.  This 
is a complex topic, best saved for another time.117  Suffice it to say that Hegel maintained a 
view of freedom.  This was freedom in a sense that balanced a variety of liberalism and 
paternalism – perhaps like contemporary rights.118  However, not unlike Marx’s communist 
utopia, future rights forms represented clear social improvement.  Future forms of right 
represented freer, indeed, more “just” and “peaceful,” societies than that which humanity had 
up to now.  There was a rights future in Hegel. 
 The notion of futures is a useful transition point towards a conclusion.  The reality is 
that alternate systems were tried in the twentieth century.  Primarily, this concerned 
socialism.  This paper in now way attempts to say that Hegel was interested in socialism.  He 
was not.119    Socialism may not have been brought to the world by revolution or even 
consensus; it may rather have been foisted upon many of the locales that experienced its 
realities.120  Still, socialism’s existence in multiple forms – Stalinism, Maoism, Hoxhaism, 
North Korea’s Juche, among others – helped define an ideological polarity central to large 
parts of the twentieth century.  This was the polarity of the Cold War.  The Cold War 
involved significant amounts of historical thinking.  This involved historical-philosophical 
arguments; arguments about why one system – socialism or liberal democracy – was 
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inevitable.  These were arguments about how one or the other system accorded more 
thoroughly with the nature of “man.”  The foundation of the Soviet Union, Stalin claimed, 
was the “objective…reorganization of society.”121  This was based on the “rich experience” 
of “history.”122  Proponents of liberalism of course argued the opposite.123 
 It is an open question whether it is possible to find arguments like this anymore.  In 
1989, philosopher Slavoj Žižek argued that ideology concerned “antagonistic splits” in 
competing visions of social order.124  Žižek, of course, wrote just when major portions of 
ideological fault lines were being smoothed over; “velvet revolution” consumed Eastern 
Europe (of course, the transition was less than “velvet” in places such as Romania), the 
Communist Party in China maintained an authoritarian hand yet had been liberalizing its 
economy since the 1980s, and the state that started it all – the USSR – was two years from 
disappearing altogether.  North Korea and Cuba would be all that was left of the old school.  
Perhaps it was the “end of history,” one commentator argued.125  Francis Fukuyama, of 
course, meant the “end of history” in terms of competitions between socialist and liberal 
powers.  The “end of history” also had something to do with ideas, though.  One concept had 
won.  Systems and the individuals that supported them did not need to make historical, 
“nature of man,” arguments anymore.126  History made those itself. 
 In 1989 came the liberalization of the world system – indeed, perhaps the world’s 
integration into a single economic and political (never mind cultural) system – was a boon 
for processes of globalization.  Technologies could flow more freely across borders.  Markets 
might become increasingly integrated.  Media could become more diverse yet simultaneously 
more homogenous as similar images became more widespread.  Language became 
increasingly homogenized as English experienced a bump in dominance only previously 
experienced with the expansion of the British Empire.127  One theorist on such issues has 
posited the notion of “-scapes” – “landscapes” of people, money, ideas, images and 
technology washing across broad sets of borders, creating terrains on which groups and 
individuals contest their identities.128  We are no longer involved in the simple 
argumentations for ideas.  Rather, we are today involved in odd, asymmetrical rushes for bits 
and pieces of concepts swirling through communicative networks in an increasingly 
globalized world. 
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 Some have suggested all this effects social relations with history.  This is at least 
social relations with history as an idea.  David Harvey argued for processes of “time-space” 
compression over the course of the twentieth century.129  Harvey’s book on the issue came 
out in 1989; potentially, he had not seen the most thoroughgoing manifestations of the 
phenomena he discussed.  Roughly, however, the notion was that the world’s technologies 
(modern communications and travel technologies) had shrunk space and made society 
increasingly presentist.  Contemporary economic, social and technological forces, argued 
Harvey, made us “flexible;” humanity moved, as laborers, tourists, communicators and even 
citizens, to increasingly diverse global locales.  The inhabitant of the modern world, Harvey 
argued, did not always know where he or she belonged.  It was the “end of all narratives and 
meta-theories.”130  It was the beginning of an age of forgetting about history – longer-term 
senses of human identity and senses of connectedness with time. 
 Philosophers, however, had been at work for some time picking on the idea of 
history.  As noted, historians and philosophers have considering the nature of historical 
knowledge for many years.  Analytical philosophers of history had always dissected history’s 
truth claims.  “What counts as historical reality” was the province of not only historians, but 
those who would comprehend how history was written.131  White’s work represents a 
contribution to such thinking.  However, deeper, existential and in themselves somehow 
historical claims were also made about the problem.  History, particular groups of theorists 
began to claim, might not be a kind of space in which knowledge emerged.  One might not 
“find” history.  Rather, history itself might be an order of knowledge.  History might be a 
“cultural code;” a reorganization of relations between “words” and “things.”132  History 
might not be transcendental.  History might be a cultural construct. 
 The emergence, popularity and even potential dominance of the concept of human 
rights at a time that seems to have such complicated relations with the idea of history makes 
one reflect.  In contemporary society, we come into contact with human rights or at least 
rights representations, in many ways.  We hear about human rights in the news.  Samuel 
Moyn has shown that already in the 1970s, media references to human rights were on the 
rise.133  This trend would only seem to have continued.  The number of international rights 
organizations has taken off, and human rights have become an increasingly debated 
dimension of foreign policy.134  Human rights are deployed in entertainment media – top 
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selling films like Blood Diamond (2006), The Interpreter (2005) and Hotel Rwanda (2004) 
are organized around rights themes.  Major international corporations maintain social 
responsibility platforms incorporating human rights.135  Clothing companies – Benetton is the 
most famous – use human rights for advertising; rights clothing for global, middle class 
populations.136  The philosopher Norberto Bobbio posited that ours might be an “age of 
rights.”137  Though perhaps an exaggeration, he might not be totally off the mark.  Human 
rights might be as dominant as any political or social idea on the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century intellectual marketplace. 
 The point becomes this:  are we, via human rights, recuperating a lost relationship 
with the idea of history?  Via confrontations with human rights, are we subtly encouraged to 
re-immerse ourselves in large-scale imaginations and beliefs concerning the past – beliefs 
seemingly belonging to another era?  There are no easy answers.  Human rights are very 
clearly a historical idea.  “Historical idea,” means less that human rights come from ideas in 
the past – though they do.  Rather, “historical idea” means that concepts, imaginations of, 
and, arguing about and philosophizing on history is a subtle but central dimension of rights.  
Human rights come awfully close to maintaining something that looks like a full-blown 
philosophy of history – beginning to end narratives, descriptions of history’s “middle” 
sections, senses of direction for the past and even, with a bit of nudging, theories of change.  
At least human rights maintain concepts that can be massaged into theories of change.  That 
is not incidental.  The past is on human rights’ mind.  The past is a territory out of which 
human rights make their claim to legitimacy – the naturalness of rights, rights’ concordance 
with what humanity is and (thus) the inevitability of rights’ realization. 
 Of course, one may not perceive oneself as having a relationship with history.  
Historians and philosophers of history surely do. The man or woman in the street, however, 
may not invest extensive energy into thinking about their relations with the past.  The past 
may fade into rough, intuitive backgrounds.  Still, whether it is due to changes in the 
dimensions of global politics, relations with globalization and technology or even more 
academically-oriented doubts about the past and its objective existence, there may be forces 
abound exculpating us from senses that in fact we should and do think about the past.  
Members of contemporary society may get subtle yet nonetheless present messages from 
diverse ranges of locales suggesting that the past is no territory for the present – history is no 
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longer the terrain of the modern mind.  To the extent that we are interested in the idea of 
human rights, however, this may not be true.  History, history’s modes of change, patterns, 
rhythms and narratives seem to be very much be human rights’ terrain.  To that extent, such 
issues might be our terrain – a home of sorts for us – as well. 
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